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The Journal of Religion 
has ushered in the reign of self-interest as the sole reliable basis for political life. 
There are wise and interesting observations here and there throughout this book, 
but the overall structure of its grandiose argument is completely untenable. 
WILFRED M. MCCLAY, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
CARE, NORMAN. Living with One's Past: Personal Fates and Moral Pain. Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. xiii+203 pp. $57.50 (cloth); $22.95 (paper). 
Norman Care explores the moral problems associated with past wrongdoing 
about which the ascription of agency and responsibility is controversial and that 
causes anguish sufficient to interfere with future moral agency. Care uses liberal 
philosophy to determine if moral reconciliation to one's past is possible. He con- 
cludes that the liberal view of human nature leads to morally inappropriate blame 
or praise, cannot explain the moral pain that some experience, and fails to pro- 
vide the entitlement to go on living. His observations about the moral pain faced 
by alcoholics in coming to terms with their past, for example, prompt him to 
conclude that humans may differ in their basic constitutions. While overcoming 
deep difficulties may be supererogatory, overcoming constitutional flaws may be 
impossible. 
Care does a great service to victims of abuse by demonstrating that they de- 
serve neither reproach nor blame for the ways they act subsequent to their 
trauma. Given their psychic disabilities, they were doing the best they could at 
the time. However, in attempting to protect them from moral censure, he confines 
some to a life without the possibility of integrity. Their moral fate is sealed by his 
conviction that psychic damage may be permanent, leaving them unable to "do 
right." "That we can in general expect or demand morally . . . that people over- 
come, recover, resist, and do right-as if they were dealing with weaknesses, or 
the stress that we expect the ordinary in-control person to bear-no longer seems 
right to me" (p. 85). (Unfortunately Care does not deconstruct the liberal view of 
the will and never explores why exhortation and harangue do not effect change.) 
New norms of personal justice are needed toward the constitutionally flawed, 
such as generosity, patience, tolerance, and withholding blame. 
Unfortunately Care does not expose readers to the rich theological literature 
that would have brought into the discussion concepts such as sin, grace, habits, 
and forgiveness. Nor does he draw on the significant feminist literature, which 
has already demonstrated the fallacies and inadequacies of liberal moral anthro- 
pology. Care could have been more careful to apply his own insights to his conclu- 
sions. He notes that "perhaps oppression is successful when it imposes a concept 
of person on one and also brings it about that one's sense of choice in the matter 
is completely lost" (p. 67). He does not use a hermeneutic of suspicion to question 
his own ascription of "fixed" habits to inherent nature as a possible expression of 
his own internalized oppression. 
The book is a useful exploration of the everyday, lived tensions of dealing with 
the harm associated with one's past, especially when one is not sure if one is 
responsible for this harm and when one finds the available tools from Enlighten- 
ment philosophy in the dominant culture wholly inadequate, if not downright 
pernicious, for making moral sense of one's life. The book would be suitable for 
undergraduate and graduate study as well as for use by therapists and pastoral 
counselors. 
JUDITH W. KAY, University of Puget Sound. 
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